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legal issues

Affirmative Action Returns
to the Supreme Court
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.

The Supreme Court
considered the issue
of affirmative action
in admission policies
yet again.

O

ne of the most hotly contested
issues in education during the
past-half century is afﬁrmative action, also known as
race-based admissions policies. Supporters
defend the practice as one designed to take
“afﬁrmative” steps to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination. Critics
respond that these policies do not address
how granting preferences today remedies
past harms, especially because individuals
who are passed over when afﬁrmative action
is applied played no role in creating past
inequities.
Insofar as debate over afﬁrmative action
has heated up yet again, this column brieﬂy
examines the history of Fisher v. University
of Texas II (2016) wherein the Supreme
Court upheld the University of Texas’s
reliance on race in admissions. Then, the
column focuses on the impact afﬁrmative
action can have on K–12 schools, reﬂecting
on the meaning of Fisher II for school business ofﬁcials, their boards, and other educational leaders.
Fisher v. University of Texas
In the past, as part of seeking admission at
the University of Texas (UT), applicants
were subjected to two different processes.
The ﬁrst process was governed by Texas’
Top 10 Percent Law, which was designed
to increase minority enrolments by granting
automatic admissions to minorities graduating in the top 10% of their classes (Texas
Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803(a-1) 2015). This
process, adopted as the Top Ten Percent
Plan (TTPP) at UT, does not take race into
consideration. Using this plan, UT ofﬁcials
ﬁlled “up to 75 percent of the places . . . [a
percentage] which has now been ﬁxed by
statute” (Fisher II, p. 2206).
Following the Supreme Court’s 2003
judgment in Grutter v. Bollinger (2002) that
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afﬁrmed the University of Michigan Law
School’s consideration of race in admissions
in order to achieve diversity, ofﬁcials in
Texas revised the second admissions process
to include individualized holistic review.
Holistic review is a ﬂexible, individualized
way to assess an applicant’s capabilities,
taking into consideration experiences, attributes, and academic metrics.
The ﬁrst step in the holistic review admissions process at UT requires ofﬁcials to
develop an Academic Index for applicants
derived from their scores on the SAT and
academic performance in high school.
Next, ofﬁcials develop a Personal Achievement Index (PAI), which is a numeric score
derived from student written essays and
recommendations plus evaluations of their
leadership skills, records of participation in
extracurricular activities, awards/ honors
received, and other special circumstances
such as socioeconomic status (SES) of applicants’ families and schools as well as race
to enhance their potential contribution to
the student body. Using this process, UT
ofﬁcials perform a full-ﬁle individualized
holistic review to admit the remaining 25%
of their ﬁrst year classes (Fisher II, p. 2206).
Judicial History
Fisher v. University of Texas was ﬁled by
two white female high school graduates who
were denied entry to the university in the
fall of 2008 under a policy admitting the top
10% of graduating classes. The plaintiffs
alleged that Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law—
designed to increase minority enrollments by
granting automatic admissions to students
graduating in the top 10% of their classes—
discriminated against them because of race
in violation of their right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes.
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One of the students withdrew
from the case, but Fisher, who
was in the top 12% of her class,
remained active in the case even
though she attended, and graduated
from, Louisiana State University.
A federal trial court in Texas
(Fisher 2009) granted UT’s motion
for summary judgment, essentially
dismissing the case because it was
convinced ofﬁcials’ consideration of
race as a factor in admissions was
supported by a compelling interest that was narrowly tailored to
achieve its goal. On further review,
the Fifth Circuit afﬁrmed that the
policy was supported by the compelling interest of achieving a critical mass of minorities rather than
outright racial balancing (Fisher
2011b). Dissatisﬁed with the outcome, the student appealed to the
Supreme Court in what is now called
Fisher I (2013).
In Fisher I, ruling in favor of the
student, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded earlier judgments in
favor of UT on the basis that the
Fifth Circuit failed to apply strict
scrutiny. In mandating the strict
scrutiny review, the Court directed
UT ofﬁcials to prove that there was
no alternative to race-conscious
admissions plans.
On remand in Fisher I, (2014a)
paying scant attention to strict scrutiny, a divided Fifth Circuit afﬁrmed
that UT ofﬁcials demonstrated that
race-conscious holistic review was
necessary. Again dissatisﬁed, the student appealed to the Supreme Court
(Fisher I 2015).
Afﬁrming in favor of UT, Justice
Kennedy opened the majority opinion in Fisher II (2016) by noting that
“[t]he Court is asked once again to
consider whether the race-conscious
admissions program at the University of Texas is lawful under the
Equal Protection Clause” (p. 2205).
Kennedy was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
After reviewing the facts, Justice
Kennedy acknowledged that because
race seldom provides a rationale for
34

Fisher II provided little guidance to K–12 leaders
about taking race, or other factors, into consideration
in pursuit of diversity. However, in light of similar
pending litigation at Harvard University and the
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill over
afﬁrmative action (Lewontin 2016), debate about raceconscious admissions policies is far from over.
treating people disparately, it must
be justiﬁed by a compelling governmental interest. Kennedy added
that if ofﬁcials provide a principled
explanation of how race contributes
to creating diverse student bodies,
they are entitled to deference.
Justice Kennedy observed that the
admissions program at UT was “sui
generis,” literally, of its own kind,
and that insofar as UT was unlike
other institutions to the extent that
it used both holistic review and the
TTTP, even though the latter was
not at issue, its judgment might have
limited precedential value.
Finally, Justice Kennedy rebutted four arguments advanced by the
plaintiff.
1. He rejected the claim that UT
ofﬁcials failed to articulate the
need to rely on race.
2. He disagreed with the notion that
UT no longer needed to use race
in admissions because it reached
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a critical mass of minorities in its
student body.
3. He denied the plaintiff’s claim
that taking race into account was
unnecessary because it had a minimal impact on advancing UT’s
compelling interest in achieving
diversity.
4. He rebuffed the plaintiff’s call
for race-neutral alternatives such
as SES as unworkable. Kennedy
feared that if UT adopted the
plaintiff’s idea by relying on class,
in the form of SES, in the place of
race, it “would sacriﬁce all other
aspects of diversity in pursuit
of enrolling a higher number of
minority students” (p. 2213).
Justice Kennedy concluded by
reminding UT ofﬁcials of their duty
to continue to reﬁne their admissions
policies to keep them in compliance with the requirements of equal
protection.
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Reﬂections
Fisher II is the Supreme Court’s
most recent opinion on race and
education but is unlikely to be
its last. Moreover, Fisher II was
unusual because it was a four-tothree judgment following the death
of Justice Scalia and the recusal of
Justice Kagan due to her when she
worked in the United States Department of Justice. Justice Thomas ﬁled
a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito
ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas joined.
For supporters of afﬁrmative
action, the outcome in Fisher II represents the proverbial half of a loaf.
The Supreme Court did continue to
recognize diversity as a compelling
governmental interest but did not
endorse afﬁrmative action without
reservation. Yet, the Court failed to
provide clear guidance as to how the
use of race to achieve diversity satisﬁed strict scrutiny.
An important consideration to
keep in mind is that because UT
employed both the TTPP and holistic review processes in admissions,
a combination infrequently used
at other institutions, the impact of
Fisher II is unclear for institutions
of higher education as well as for
education leaders in K-12 school
systems.
Fisher II exacerbated confusion
over the use of race in admissions
because after Fisher I was remanded
to the Fifth Circuit with directions
to subject race-based admissions
to strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Fisher II also
paid little heed to this standard.
Instead, Justice Kennedy relied on
a variety of rationales inconsistent
with Fisher I’s directive to apply
strict scrutiny. Additionally, neither
the Court nor university ofﬁcials
articulated a clear rationale justifying the use of race in admissions.
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Interestingly, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion refused to take alternative
factors such as SES into account in
admissions. In response to the plaintiff’s argument that UT include factors in addition to race, he thought
that this approach “ignores the
fact that the University tried, and
failed, to increase diversity through
enhanced consideration of socioeconomic and other factors” (Fisher II,
p. 2213).
The Supreme Court’s reluctance
to include SES aside, it seems that by
considering this variable when devising programming for qualiﬁed students from lower and middle income
backgrounds, educators may be
better able to serve the neediest, and
most deserving, of applicants. Taking SES into account may also help
to establish applicant pools that are
more diverse on a variety of levels in
K-12 school systems. As such, SES is
something for education leaders to
consider when creating programming
of choice using admissions examinations or where state laws allow them
to work with charter schools operating within their districts.
Another beneﬁt of taking SES into
account is that if used to expand the
criteria for achieving diversity in student bodies via holistic review, then
afﬁrmative action might become
more acceptable to its critics by
expanding the qualiﬁcations to help
to create larger applicant pools. To
this end, it is unfortunate that in not
providing clear guidance on the constitutionality of race-based admissions policies, the Fisher II Court
largely deferred to UT ofﬁcials.
In the aftermath of Fisher II it
appears educational institutions can
continue to rely on race in admissions to foster diversity as long as
their policies employ genuinely holistic reviews of applications and are
narrowly tailored to achieve their
goals. Still, as the Supreme Court
pointed out in Grutter, programs

using race in admissions must be
“ﬂexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light
of the particular qualiﬁcations of
each applicant, and to place them on
the same footing for consideration,
although not necessarily according
them the same weight” (p. 337). In
other words, race can still be used as
a criterion but not as the sole factor
in admissions decisions.
Conclusion
Fisher II provided little guidance to
K–12 leaders about taking race, or
other factors, into consideration in
pursuit of diversity. However, in
light of similar pending litigation at
Harvard University and the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
over afﬁrmative action (Lewontin
2016), debate about race-conscious
admissions policies is far from over.
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